Whither the Crown’s interest in South Island high country land reform? by Brower, Ann L.
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The South Island high country has long been the 
subject of debate over resource use and ecological 
protection. Since early 2006, the ownership and relative 
value of property rights in high country pastoral leases 
have become controversial. This article reviews recent 
research (chiefly Brower (2006) and Brower, Monks and 
Meguire (in review)) on the law, politics and economics 
of land reform in the high country.
Flanking the eastern slopes of the Southern Alps, 
the Crown pastoral estate comprises a full tenth of 
New Zealand’s land area. This pastoral land is owned 
by the Crown, and leased long-term to farmers for 
pastoral uses, chiefly extensive grazing and residential 
occupation. Since 1992, 77 pastoral leaseholds have 
undergone a gradual land reform process called tenure 
review, which grants the former lessee full freehold 
title over some part of his leasehold. The remainder of 
the leasehold shifts into the conservation estate, to be 
managed by the Department of Conservation (DoC) as 
a reserve or park. Between 1992 and 2006, 264,000 ha 
(58%) of those leaseholds were privatised and 193,000 
ha (42%) were converted to public conservation land 
(Brower, 2007). 
Brower (2006) concluded that tenure review outcomes 
defy legal and economic logic because the Crown does 
not defend its legitimate interests during negotiations. 
This paper uses data on individual tenure review 
outcomes to test those initial findings, and confirms 
that tenure review prices are not governed by the strict 
letter of the law. This is consistent with Ellickson’s 
(1991) findings.
The traditional law and economics hy-
pothesis
Common law conceives of property as a bundle of rights, 
not a physical object. In pastoral leases, the farmer owns 
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some rights and the Crown owns others. In tenure 
review, the Crown and the lessee exchange their rights, 
along with some cash. Conventional law and economics 
predicts that how much cash the parties exchange 
depends on who owns which rights, and the rights’ value 
as estimated by empirical economic research.
The value of rights to use land for various purposes 
has been of some interest to empirical economics. In 
his study of rural land prices in New Zealand, Stillman 
(2005) found that land used for extensive pastoralism 
commanded the second lowest price among all categories 
of land use considered. The most valued land uses were 
horticulture and lifestyle blocks. Land developed in any 
way beyond extensive pastoralism was 2.5 to 14 times 
more valuable than land used for extensive pastoralism. 
Though attenuated by the lease contract, the rights to 
develop land appear more valuable than the rights to 
graze land (Brower, 2006, 2007).
Who owns the valuable development rights is a matter 
of legal interpretation. Not surprisingly, there are 
several competing claims of ownership. The Land Act 
1948 and the Crown Pastoral Land Act (CPLA) 1998 
stipulate that the lessee holds the right of exclusive 
pasturage (grazing) and exclusive occupancy (to reside 
on the leasehold and to exclude trespassers). And he 
owns the value of all physical alterations to the land 
(housing, fencing, barns, fertiliser). Moreover, pastoral 
leases are perpetually renewable, and the rights they 
grant are transferable and compensable if revoked by 
the Crown. 
Meanwhile, the Crown owns title and all other use 
rights. Extensive pastoralism is construed so narrowly 
that a lessee may not even irrigate without Crown 
consent. Though the Crown has, in certain cases, 
consented to specific land uses other than extensive 
pastoralism, Brower (2006) argued that, by virtue of its 
control rights, the Crown withholds the all-important 
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right to develop the land under lease. Under this 
interpretation, tenure review consists of the Crown’s 
notional purchase of the lessee’s rights to graze and 
occupy the land, and notional sale to the lessee of its 
rights to adjudicate development of the land. Hence 
what the Crown sells appears more valuable than what 
the Crown buys.
Indeed, the New Zealand Treasury (1995) estimated 
that the Crown’s rights in the pastoral estate were worth 
$50 million in 1995; the corresponding lessees’ interest 
was worth $36.4 million. Hence the Crown’s share of 
the total value was 50/(50+36.4) = 58%. This fraction 
is called the Crown’s interest (Brower, Monks and 
Meguire, in review). The remaining 42% is the lessee’s 
interest. These estimates seem to bear out Brower’s 
(2006, 2007) contention that the Crown should net 
money under tenure review.
However, some disagree (see Aspinall, 2006; Scott, 
2006; Wallace, 2006b; Wallace, 2006c; Gorman, 2006). 
Some have argued that the Crown does not own the full 
development rights, so the lessee’s interest is more valuable 
than the Crown’s; hence the Crown should rightfully pay 
lessees. Three variants of this argument appeared in the 
New Zealand press over the course of 2006:
1 Lessee owns 50% of the value of development rights: 
‘The value of these [development] opportunities 
is shared between the two parties to the contract.’ 
(Aspinall, 2006)
2 Farmer owns 100% of the value of development 
rights:1 ‘These potentially valuable unallocated rights 
have been alienated by the Crown.’ (Thomson, 
2006; echoed by Armstrong et al., 2006)
3 Development rights have no value, and the Crown’s 
interest is just the net present value of rent: ‘The value 
Figure 1: Law and economics hypothesis 
100%
0%
58%
Percentage of each leasehold area privatised
100%
Crown owns 100% of dev’t
rights
Treasury estimate
Crown owns 50% of dev’t
rights
Crown owns 100% of dev’t
rights
dev’t = 0 value
C
row
n’s interest  (%
)
1 while tenure review has been controversial for some time, assertions 
that lessees own some or all development rights are of recent 
date. Prior to 2006, the only times use rights had come up was 
in discussions of how much rent the government should charge. 
lessees argued that their rents should be low on the grounds 
that lessees do not own development rights. See, for example: 
‘Mr Aubrey [then chair of High Country Accord] said any [rent] rise 
should take into account that … land was subject to restrictions. “To 
make an urban analogy, it would be like leasing a gorse-covered 
section in a town with no right to clear the gorse or right to build a 
house, with no services laid on such as water, power and sewage. 
You would have to ask the Crown for permission to undertake any 
work on the land”’ (Otago Daily Times, 22 February 2005).
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of the lessor’s interest is no more than the present value 
of the stream of rental income.’ (Evans and Quigley, 
2006; echoed by Armstrong et al., 2006) 
As economic reasoning predicts that the Crown’s interest 
will be a function of ownership and value of property 
rights in the land under lease, four claims of ownership 
yield four variants of a hypothesis. Because ownership 
is set by statute and does not vary across leaseholds, a 
scatterplot of the Crown’s interest in a leasehold, against 
the percentage of a leasehold privatised under tenure 
review, will result in points randomly scattered about a 
horizontal line. The height of that line will depend on 
who owns which rights. Four of the five lines in Figure 1 
arise from one of the proposed readings of the applicable 
law, and the fifth arises from Treasury’s estimate.
The value of the Crown’s interest will vary because 
leaseholds have idiosyncratic characteristics. For 
instance, rights to develop lakefront land are more 
valuable than rights to develop isolated land. But as 
location is not correlated with percentage privatised 
(Brower, Monks and Meguire, in review), it will 
introduce variability in the scatterplot but will not alter 
the slope of the predicted line.
Improvements might also influence price, because when 
the Crown buys back the grazing rights in improved 
land, it must also buy the improvements. But the CPLA 
also stipulates that land:
1 ‘capable of economic use’ should be privatised; 
2 with conservation and recreation value should be 
conserved ‘(preferably)’ in public ownership (CPLA 
§24(a)(ii and iii)). 
As not every hectare of every lease has been improved, 
the privatised land is likely to include most improved 
land because improved land: 1) does not have major 
conservation value;2 and 2) is, by definition, capable 
of economic use. 
Hence the Crown compensates for the loss of 
improvements only if the Crown buys improvements 
in land that it does not take. The Crown will, of course, 
compensate for some improvements, but this should 
not cause the slope of that line to deviate from zero. If 
improvements do alter the slope of the line, it suggests 
a serious bookkeeping error, whereby the Crown is 
behaving like a shopper who pays for something only 
to leave it at the checkout stand.
In sum, the conventional law and economics hypothesis 
predicts that the scatterplot will consist of points randomly 
scattered about a horizontal line. The height of this line 
reveals the Crown’s interest averaged over all deals. The 
Crown’s interest and the size of the Crown payout in turn 
depend on who owns the development rights.
The apolitical administration  
hypothesis
In stark contrast to Treasury’s estimate that the Crown 
would net money in tenure review, Land Information 
New Zealand (LINZ) annual reports on revenue and 
expenditures for the years 1992–2005 reveal that the 
Crown has paid $18.2 million more than it has received 
in payments, with only ≈20% of leaseholds having 
been reformed. The dissonance between the Treasury 
prediction and policy outcome suggests that something 
other than conventional law and economics might be 
driving tenure review prices.
Indeed, the agency (LINZ) administering tenure 
review follows a policy–operations split (see Boston et 
al., 1991, pp.260-5) as follows: decisions about policy 
direction and political advice to Cabinet are taken by 
people employed in a division of LINZ distinct from 
the part that implements policy (the ‘operations’). LINZ 
officials report that tenure review is wholly administered 
by people employed on the operations side of this split, 
who are purportedly ‘outside the washing machine of 
politics’. Further, tenure review negotiations are not 
carried out by LINZ ‘operations’ officials themselves, 
but are delegated to contractors from three property 
management and consultancy firms – Quotable Value, 
DTZ and Opus. Hence LINZ appears to subscribe to 
the politics–administration dichotomy, first proposed by 
Woodrow Wilson (1887), positing that administration 
can and should be apolitical.
In tenure review implementation, ‘apolitical’ seems 
to morph into commercially ‘neutral’ in negotiations. 
LINZ instructs the contract negotiators to be neutral, 
to listen with an open mind, not to advocate for the 
Crown, and not to take sides in negotiations. Further, 
several contract negotiators have described LINZ 
instructions in the following manner: ‘[They told us 
2	 In	 interviews,	DoC	officials	 in	Canterbury	 and	Otago	 state	 that	
improved	land	is	not	likely	to	be	identified	as	containing	‘significant	
inherent values’, hence is likely to be privatised.
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that] it is not our place to drive hard bargains … The 
Commissioner and LINZ [officials] have always told us 
that money should not be a constraint’; ‘Money should 
not stand in the way of a deal’; ‘The Commissioner told 
us we should not hold up the deals for money’ (Brower, 
Monks and Meguire, in review).
However, the Crown retains a financial interest in the 
land it is re-allocating. Instructing negotiators to be non-
partisan – to avoid systematically favouring conservation 
over farming land uses (or the reverse) – is defensible. 
But instructing them to be commercially neutral – 
especially where the financial interest of the Crown is 
concerned – is less defensible. A non-partisan public 
service is rightly a prominent feature of New Zealand’s 
Westminster system of government. Nevertheless, it 
appears that those administering tenure review have 
made the leap from Westminster’s non-partisan civil 
service to the less advantageous commercially neutral. 
When the Crown refuses to take sides, the interests of 
the public are at risk.
To illustrate this, consider the following ‘teeter-totter’ 
theory of public negotiations. A teeter-totter teeters 
up and down as the children riding it cooperate and 
compete. A ‘dominant’ child causes his side to totter 
to the ground with a loud thunk. Similarly, if the 
Crown advocated for the 58% interest estimated by 
Treasury, the power dynamics in the negotiations would 
look something like Figure 2a. But if the Crown were 
neutral and avoided advocating for its interest, then the 
Crown would probably recoup less money than law and 
economics predicts (see Figure 2b).
In short, the apolitical administration hypothesis posits 
that failure to advocate amounts to a tacit agreement 
to lose. In asking ‘who is sticking up for the Crown?’, 
Brower (2006, p.3) answered, ‘the politics of tenure 
review remain win-win as long as the Crown agrees 
to lose’. If apolitical administration indeed leads the 
3  A demand curve predicts someone’s willingness to pay for a good. 
Assuming that a good has a positive value, one will be willing to 
pay for it. But the price one is willing to pay depends on the quantity 
she acquires. An individual is willing to pay a high price for 1 kg of 
prime steak. But she is willing to pay less per kilo for 20kg of steak. 
At 100kg of steak, she is willing to pay very little per kilo. Hence the 
marginal utility of each kilogram of steak declines with the volume 
acquired. This translates to a downwardly sloping demand curve. 
The height and exact shape of the curve depend on what the 
individual is buying, but demand curves slope down, and she who 
buys the most steak gets the most generous price. 
Figures 2a and 2b
Crown to not advocate for its monetary interest, then 
the Crown will pay what the lessees want it to pay. Hence 
the aforementioned scatterplot will reveal a downward 
sloping relation resembling the lessees’ demand curve 
for freehold land.3
Agency theory and the principal-agent 
hypothesis
Agency theory tells a story differing somewhat from 
that of apolitical administration, and paints a somewhat 
bleaker picture. A principal–agent problem (Niskanen, 
1971) occurs when the agent ignores or subverts the 
principal’s goals (Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Ricketts, 
2002, ch.5; Waterman and Meier, 1998; Mueller, 2003). 
Several institutional features of tenure review suggest 
that it might be subject to a principal–agent problem:
Since 1998 the Crown has been represented in tenure 
review negotiations by contractors hired by LINZ and 
employed by one of three property management firms 
(DTZ, Opus and Quotable Value). These contractors 
answer to LINZ officials.
Contractors are not paid on commission, but are 
paid pre-arranged contractual sums for administrative 
progress towards the ultimate goal (a signed tenure 
review deal). Hence the Crown does not pay more for 
a cheap deal or less for an expensive deal, nor does the 
Crown set a reserve price from which the contractors 
negotiate.
LINZ
585
lessee
42%
lessee
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Until August 2006, tenure review outcomes were 
confidential, giving rise to asymmetric information. 
Only LINZ and the contractors knew who paid whom 
how much in a given deal.
Agency theory posits, in short, that agents are 
most mindful of those outcomes for which they 
are accountable and rewarded, and least mindful 
of outcomes for which they are not accountable 
and not rewarded. When instructed to do X, but 
rewarded when they do Y, agents often do Y – 
especially when few can ascertain if the agent is 
doing X, Y, or even Z.
In tenure review, the ministerial principal directs the 
agents to: 1) complete tenure review deals;4 and 2) 
get a ‘fair financial return for the Crown’ (Cabinet 
Policy Committee, 2003, 2005). But contractors are 
paid when they close deals, being neither rewarded 
for driving a hard bargain nor penalised for paying 
too much. The principal–agent hypothesis predicts 
that agents will follow the principal’s directive to 
close deals, but ignore the directive to be fair to 
taxpayers. When scatterplotted, the data from easy 
deals would trace out the lessee’s demand curve. But 
when a lessee drives a hard bargain, the prices would 
reveal agents’ willingness to sacrifice the Crown’s 
interest, and the resulting data would plot below 
the lessees’ demand curve.
4 In 2003 Cabinet encouraged closing deals by setting a deadline that 
all pastoral leases would have completed tenure review by the year 
2008. That deadline has since been relaxed. (wallace, 2003)
Figure 3: Three competing hypotheses (adapted from Brower, Monks and Meguire, in review) 
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Tenure review outcomes
In August 2006 the minister of land information 
consented to release the individual transaction prices 
(Beston, 2006). These data enabled testing of the 
theoretical predictions against the data for the 77 deals 
completed between 1992 and 2006.
Most points trace out a line with a slope of –1, consistent 
with the apolitical administration hypothesis and fully 
inconsistent with any prediction of law and economics. 
He who gets the most land gets the best price. Sixteen 
of the 77 dots fall well below this line, indicating that 
the Crown’s interest is even lower, and the review 
hence more favourable to the lessee, than the apolitical 
administration thesis predicts. Each of these 16 deals 
was completed after 1998 and features a Crown payout 
exceeding $250,000 (one was $5.6 million). Auxiliary 
variables (rent, easements and location combined) 
explain only 39% of the deviation from the diagonal 
line (Brower, Monks and Meguire, in review). 
Discussion
The declassified prices suggest that price negotiations 
start – and usually end – on the lessees’ demand curve, 
and that the law of property does not shape tenure review 
outcomes (Brower, Monks and Meguire, in review). 
While it is appropriate for lessees to drive hard bargains 
with the Crown, it is less appropriate for the Crown to 
readily capitulate. To agree to start negotiations with the 
other party’s demand curve is to agree to lose.
If the apolitical administration hypothesis were wrong, 
and the Crown were advocating its legal and financial 
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interest, the scatterplot would consist of random 
deviations from a horizontal line, whose height would 
depend on the ownership and value of development 
rights. Even if leasehold ownership held precisely the 
same value as freehold ownership (as some lessees and 
their advocates have argued; see, for example, Hutching 
(2006), citing a lessee), the results would fall along a 
horizontal line. But tenure review outcomes reject the 
law and economics hypothesis, regardless of who is 
assumed to own what.
Having rejected the law and economics hypothesis, 
and found support for the apolitical administration 
hypothesis, we turn to principal–agent. If the Crown 
were sticking up for itself even while negotiating from 
the lessees’ demand curve, a few deals would plot above 
that curve. Instead, all deviations from that curve are 
decidedly in the lessees’ favour, with a low Crown 
interest and a high Crown payout. The presence of 
points below the demand curve and the absence of 
dots above it suggest that while some lessees drive a 
Figure 4: Tenure review results 1992–2006
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altogether when the agent tells sub-agents to ignore the 
cost to the Crown. Thus, apolitical administration and 
principal–agent combine to suggest that ministerial 
authority over negotiators contracted to the operations 
side of an agency is attenuated at best. Contracting 
out of the operations side of a split agency exacerbates 
capture, rather than avoiding it. Those presiding over 
future government negotiations would be wise to avoid 
the same fate.
Finally, the above results measure only the dollars 
exchanged between the Crown and lessees, not the non-
pecuniary opportunity costs. Information asymmetry in 
agency theory predicts that money is the last thing agents 
and sub-agents will sacrifice in a negotiation, because it 
is the outcome most easily measured. In any bureaucracy, 
measurability means accountability. The non-monetary 
characteristics of land are harder to measure; hence 
contractors are less likely to be accountable for them. 
As such, tenure review negotiators will likely first 
sacrifice such things as recreation, biodiversity, landscape 
aesthetics and cultural heritage.
Conclusion
This article does not criticise, much less condemn, the 
contractors. But it appears that ministerial directions 
dissipate, then disappear, in the principal–agent–sub-
agent chain of command. Indeed, agency theory aptly 
predicts that contractors will heed the directive to close 
deals (because they are rewarded to do so) and disregard 
the directive to be fair to the taxpayer (because they are 
not penalised for ignoring it). Closing the deal at any 
cost is beneficial to all present at the negotiating table 
(the agent, the sub-agent and the lessee), at the expense 
of those absent from that table (the taxpayers) (Brower, 
Monks and Meguire, in review). Prior to September 
2006, even the minister was absent from the table 
(White, 2006).
In sum, most prices strongly resemble the lessees’ 
demand curve, except when the Crown is even more 
generous. The results bear no resemblance to the law and 
economics hypothesis, for all conceivable interpretations 
of ownership. Tenure review outcomes are consistent 
with the apolitical administration hypothesis, whereby 
no one advocates for the Crown and the Crown tacitly 
agrees to lose. But the most satisfactory explanation for 
these outcomes is that of agency theory, which predicts 
that neither financial nor opportunity cost will stand 
hard bargain, the Crown never does so. Even within the 
agree-to-lose negotiation framework, it appears that the 
Crown is not sticking up for itself.
But these datapoints below the curve emerge only 
after 1998, when Parliament passed the CPLA and 
authorised LINZ to administer tenure review (which 
had begun quietly in the bureaucracy in 1992). The 
CPLA introduced a new player in the principal–agent 
equation – the sub-agent. While contractors from only 
one firm had been accountable to only one principal 
before 1998, LINZ subsequently became an agent 
standing between the contractor (who thereby became 
a sub-agent) and the principal (Brower, Monks and 
Meguire, in review).
Although apolitical administration and principal–agent 
are subtly different narratives, their combined effect 
offers a cautionary tale about governmental negotiation 
processes. Under the former, the passivity of agents and 
sub-agents in negotiations with a vested interest leads 
to results which some would describe as agency or 
regulatory capture (Selznick, 1949; Stigler, 1971; Levine 
and Forrence, 1990). Prices that trace the vested interest’s 
demand curve certainly point to the capitulation of 
capture. But in principal–agent, sub-agents actively 
facilitate rent-seeking by offering prices even more 
generous to lessees than capture would predict. Results 
revealing that some deals are substantially more generous 
than the demand curve suggest that tenure review makes 
mere capture look rather attractive. 
Two things appear to have gone wrong. First, 
neutrality and negotiation do not mix. The New Public 
Management, and the public choice theory on which it 
relies, offer several tools designed to avoid capture. One 
such tool is the policy–operations split (see Boston et 
al., 1991, pp.40, 260-5 for a description and critique 
of the split). Tenure review negotiations are contracted 
out of the operations side of the split, which already 
professes to be politically neutral. This makes it likely 
that ministerial directions to advocate for the Crown’s 
financial interest will get shunted to the policy side of the 
split – far from the contractors (Brower, in review).
Second, in contracting, three is a crowd. Ministerial 
directives to advocate for the Crown’s financial 
interest will dissipate when agents think they should 
be impartial. They dissolve when the agent, not the 
principal, sets the contract terms. And they disappear 
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in the way of reaching an agreement. This amounts to 
‘closing the deal at any cost’. One thing is certain: when 
it comes to property rights in the high country, the law 
does not rule.
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